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Abstract
This paper examines the role played by a specic identity, dened as the attachment
to a hometown, in determining occupational choice and mobility. The analysis links
competition between ethnic networks in the Midwest when it was rst developing,
and the in-group identity that emerged endogenously to support these networks, to
institutional participation and occupational choice today. Individuals born in counties
with greater ethnic fractionalization in 1860 are today { 150 years later { (i) signicantly
more likely to participate in institutions such as churches and parochial schools that
transmit identity from one generation to the next, and (ii) signicantly less likely
to select into mobile skilled occupations. The eect of historical fractionalization on
participation in these socializing institutions actually grows stronger over the course of
the twentieth century, emphasizing the idea that small dierences in initial conditions
can have large long-term eects on institutions and economic choices.
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Modern economic theories of growth and development assign individuals to occupations on
the basis of their ability, the opportunities they have to invest in human capital, and the
types of jobs that are subsequently made available to them in the labor market (Galor and
Zeira 1993, B enabou 1996, Fernandez and Rogerson 1996, Durlauf 1996). Although these
theories go beyond the classical model by allowing for credit market imperfections and com-
plementarities in human capital investments, social scientists outside of economics have long
argued that factors unrelated to economic opportunities and constraints can also determine
career choices (eg., Weber 1930, Gans 1962). In response to this critique and in an attempt
to broaden the scope of existing economic models, this paper examines theoretically and
empirically the role played by a specic identity, dened as the attachment to a hometown,
in determining occupational choice and mobility.
Consider a town in the American Midwest, the setting for this paper. Although we do
not attempt to explicitly characterize the process through which individuals come to identify
with their hometown, this attachment is presumably a consequence of the activities and social
interactions they are exposed to in church, the school, and other community institutions in
childhood (Elder and Conger 2000). Attachment to a hometown can also in
uence economic
decisions. In a series of in
uential papers, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) develop a
theory that describes the eect of group identity on individual behavior. The insight from
their theory is that individuals suer disutility when they choose actions that deviate from
customary behavior or are not in the best interest of the group they identify with and will
consequently avoid those actions. Individuals who are attached to their hometown will thus
be more likely to stay back and contribute to their community, selecting into less mobile
occupations independently of the economic incentives and opportunities that they might
face.
This decision to stay is well described by the following quote from a resident of a small
Midwestern city, \Such a life as I came to understand it ... meant belonging to a place
rather than to a profession ... as I came to understand my children's need and my own need
for a rm home place, I came to understand my community's need for citizens who stay
put" (Sanders 2007: 67). In the sections that follow we will investigate (i) why a stronger
sense of attachment emerged in some local areas but not others when the Midwest was rst
developing, (ii) how this identity was transmitted from one generation to the next with
the support of permanent community institutions, and (iii) what consequences it has for
occupational choice and mobility today.
The Midwest developed extremely rapidly following the railroad expansion of the 1850's.
Economic growth led to an in
ux of European migrants. These migrants typically ended up
1in unstable and marginal segments of the labor market, where the uncertain labor demand
provided the impetus for the formation of ethnic networks (Conzen 1976, Hoerder 1991).
Most theories of identity formation are based on the in-group versus out-group dichotomy
rst proposed by Sumner (1906), with competition between groups giving rise to in-group
identity. Our explanation in Section 2 for why stronger identity, as we have dened it, would
have emerged in some local areas or counties when the Midwest was being settled follows
this tradition and complements new research that seeks to model the instilling of values as
an endogenous response to economic incentives (Tabellini 2008). When ethnic groups are
competing in a local labor market, the cost imposed on a group by the migration of one of
its members is increasing in the degree of competition, which is conveniently measured by a
standard fractionalization statistic (one minus the Herndahl index of group concentration).
Ethnic groups in highly fractionalized locations would thus have had a greater incentive to
establish community institutions that created identity and tied individuals to their hometown
when the Midwest was developing. While the presence of ethnic networks in the labor market
and subsequent competition between these networks is not particular to the Midwest, what
makes this region especially well suited for our analysis is a well dened starting point {
around 1860 { and the availability of individual-level data from the population census in
that year. Using the 1-in-100 sample from the 1860 IPUMS, ethnic fractionalization in the
labor market can be computed in each Midwestern county that was incorporated and had
foreign-born workers.
Based on the preceding discussion, a stronger identity or attachment would have emerged
in historically fractionalized counties.1 If identity subsequently persisted over time, the rst
prediction of the model developed in Section 3 is that individuals born in historically frac-
tionalized counties should be less likely to select into mobile skilled occupations today. But
what is the mechanism underlying such persistence? Parents exert costly eort to social-
ize their children in Bisin and Verdier's (2000) pioneering model of cultural transmission.
In an economy where internal migration is relatively high on average, the persistence of
identity within families (or dynasties) will not explain dierences across counties over many
generations. Our dynamic model thus assumes that socialization occurs within permanent
community institutions instead. There is a xed cost to coordinating the eorts of many
individuals and so only some communities nd it worthwhile to invest in the activities and
social interactions that are needed for identity formation in the initial period of the model
(for reasons described above). Once this initial investment is made, children who participate
in socializing institutions such as churches and schools in those communities develop identity
1Attachment to the home community could have subsequently emerged in a county for other reasons.
1860 fractionalization thus explains some but not all of the variation in identity across counties. We focus on
the initial condition because this allows us to trace the dynamic process through which identity evolved and
because it will be less correlated with other determinants of occupational choice today (as discussed below).
2with xed probability in all the generations that follow. As in Bisin and Verdier, we assume
that individuals with identity want their children to share these values. This generates the
second prediction of the model, which is that participation in these socializing institutions
will be greater in historically fractionalized counties, with this eect growing stronger over
time as identity propagates through the population.
A common thread running through historical accounts of the settling of the Midwest is
the role of the church in forming new communities based on common nationality and resi-
dential location in the United States. The church continues to lie at the center of a cluster
of inter-linked civic institutions around which life in a Midwestern town revolves. We thus
expect churches and other related institutions in historically fractionalized counties to have
been oriented toward instilling values that attach their members to their hometown, with
this orientation persisting over the generations. Data on church participation are available
at roughly ten-year intervals from 1870 to 2000 from the Census of Religious Bodies (CRB).
As predicted, participation in these socializing institutions is greater in historically fraction-
alized counties, with the participation-gap growing wider over time. Matching this striking
persistence over more than a century, population-census data from 1970 and 1980 indicate
that a signicantly larger fraction of students in historically fractionalized counties are en-
rolled in parochial schools, which will support the church in building community ties. To test
the key prediction of the model for occupational choice, we take advantage of the fact that
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) collects information on the respondents'
county of birth. Complementing the results on church participation and parochial school
enrollment, individuals born in historically fractionalized counties select into less mobile oc-
cupations and are signicantly less likely to have migrated from their county of birth by 2000
(when they are on average 39 years old). It is reassuring to observe that results consistent
with the model are obtained with three outcomes and three independent data sets.
Our interpretation of these results is that individuals born in historically fractionalized
counties are exposed to socializing institutions in childhood, which increases the level of
participation in these institutions and discourages them from leaving in adulthood. The fact
that identity or attachment is not observed should not be a cause for concern. There is,
after all, a well established tradition in economics testing demand theory without observing
preferences. The more relevant concern is that 1860 fractionalization could be correlated
with economic opportunities or constraints today. While fractionalization might generate
in-group identity, the negative eects of fractionalization on inter-group cooperation and
public good provision have also been extensively documented. If individuals face a greater
cost of investing in human capital in historically fractionalized counties because school qual-
ity is lower today, for example, then we are back to a standard explanation for dierences
in occupational choice across locations. Our strategy to deal with the con
icting eects of
3fractionalization is to go back to the mid-nineteenth century when the Midwest was being
settled, which is when community institutions were being established and in-group identity
would have formed but is long before major expenditures on public schooling and local in-
frastructure occurred. As we show, theoretically and empirically in the paper, identity could
persist long after the economic circumstances that gave rise to it had ceased to be relevant.
We nevertheless take care in Section 4 to rule out the possibility that individuals born in
historically fractionalized counties select into less mobile occupations, which are associated
with lower levels of college completion, simply because the availability of skilled jobs is lower
or the cost of investing in human capital is higher in those counties today. Historical fraction-
alization is uncorrelated with the skill-mix of locally available jobs, expenditures on public
education, test scores, and educational attainment.
Can persistent dierences across communities be explained by dierences in institutional
quality alone? Examination of the model indicates that such persistence could be obtained
without a role for identity if there are increasing returns to scale in the benets that com-
munity institutions provide. As discussed below, such economies of scale are unlikely to
be relevant in our Midwestern setting. Alternatively, suppose that there is a xed cost to
investing in the activities and social interactions that give rise to identity in the initial pe-
riod. Once these investments were made in historically fractionalized counties, the superior
institutions that emerged could have provided greater benets to all their residents in the
generations that followed. We show formally that this cannot explain the key empirical
result, which is that the supply of mobile skilled labor is lower in historically fractionalized
counties, despite the fact that the availability of skilled jobs does not vary systematically
with fractionalization. While wages will adjust for dierences in institutional quality across
counties in a competitive labor market, this would not aect the allocation of individuals to
jobs. What identity does is to place a premium on a specic location { the hometown { and
this is what generates the mismatch between the supply and the availability of skilled jobs
in equilibrium.
How large are the eects we have uncovered? Our estimates indicate that a one standard
deviation increase in 1860 fractionalization would reduce migration out of the birth-county
in 2000 by 14 percent. The foreign-born workers that are used to compute the fraction-
alization statistic in 1860 account for less than 15 percent of the population in that year.
Although a persistent (and increasing) role for historical fractionalization is consistent with
a model in which identity is propagating through the population over many generations, it
is nevertheless quite remarkable that county-level dierences 150 years ago based on such a
small fraction of the population could continue to have large eects on migration and ca-
reer decisions across counties that are currently indistinguishable with respect to standard
determinants of occupational choice.
42 Initial Conditions
We begin this section by describing the early development of the Midwest and the compe-
tition between migrant ethnic groups in local labor markets that occurred at the time. We
then proceed to derive the relationship between this competition, measured by ethnic frac-
tionalization at the level of the county, and the strength of the hometown ties that would
have emerged. This section concludes with a description of the fractionalization statistic
that is used to measure initial identity across our Midwestern counties.
2.1 Institutional Setting
The Midwest rst began to be settled in the early nineteenth century with the expansion of
the national canal system (Fishlow 2000). However, it was only with the arrival of the railroad
that the Midwest took o on a steeper growth trajectory. Before 1850 the Midwest had less
than one thousand miles of track, but almost ten thousand were added by 1857 (Meyer
1989). Indeed, more than half the track-miles built in the United States between 1853 and
1856 were added in the Midwest (Atack et al., forthcoming). Improved rail transportation
spurred industrialization and this region's share of national manufacturing increased rapidly
between 1860 and 1920, with almost half of this increase occurring in the 1860's (Meyer 1989).
This increase in economic activity led, in turn, to an increase in the demand for labor. In
1810, approximately 6 percent of the labor force (outside the southern states) resided in
the Midwest. By 1860, this share had increased to 41 percent, with a further increase to
51 percent by 1880, after which regional growth converged to the national average (Margo
1999).
The preceding discussion suggests that 1860, just after the railroad boom, would serve
as an appropriate point in time at which initial conditions in the Midwest were established.
Settlement patterns and railroad diusion over the 1850-1900 period presented in Figure 1
are consistent with this view. Restricting attention to states that had been settled by 1860,
the Midwest consists of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin
(Missouri, the only pre-Civil War slave state in the Midwest, is excluded from the analysis).
Using county-level census data we see that the number of incorporated counties in those
states increases sharply from 1850 to 1860 and then 
attens out in Figure 1. Information on
railroads, obtained from the Historical Map Archive at the University of Alabama, indicates
that the number of these counties with a railroad also increases steeply over the 1850-1870
period, growing thereafter at a slower rate.2 Although we treat 1860 as the initial period in
2Railroad maps were used to construct a county-level binary variable indicating whether any part of a
railroad ran through the county in a given year. Railroad maps were unavailable in some census years in
which case we used maps that were closest in vintage to those census years (the discrepancy never exceeded
three years).
5the analysis that follows, the results are robust to using 1850 or 1870 instead.
The rapid expansion of the railroad system and the economic activity that accompanied
it led to a steep increase in the population of the Midwest as well as an in
ux of foreign
migrants. Using county-level census statistics, the total population in our seven Midwestern
states grew from less than 5 million in 1850 to 20 million in 1900. The number of foreign-
born migrants nearly tripled between 1850 and 1860, reaching close to 15 percent of the
population. Labor markets in the nineteenth century could be divided into three segments:
a stable segment with permanent employment, an unstable segment with periodic short-term
unemployment, and a marginal but highly 
exible segment characterized by spells of long-
term and short-term unemployment (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). Migrants being
newcomers to the U.S. market typically ended up in the unstable and marginal segments,
where the uncertain labor demand naturally provided an impetus for the formation of ethnic
networks that helped their members nd jobs (Conzen 1976, Hoerder 1991).
Accounts by contemporary observers and an extensive social history literature indicate
that friends and kin from the origin community in Europe played an important role in
securing jobs for migrants in the Midwest in the nineteenth century and the rst quarter of
the twentieth century. As an immigrant to the Midwest put it, \The only way you got a job
[was] through somebody at work who got you in" (Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982: 56).
Early historical studies used census data, which provide occupations and country of birth, to
identify ethnic clusters in particular locations and occupations (Hutchinson 1956, Gordon,
Edwards, and Reich 1982). More recently, social historians have linked parish registers
and county data in specic European sending communities to census and church records
in the United States to construct the entire chain of migration from those communities as
it unfolded over time. This research has documented the formation of new settlements in
the Midwest by pioneering migrants, the subsequent channeling of migrants from the origin
community in Europe to these settlements, as well as the movement of groups from the
original settlement to new satellite colonies elsewhere in the United States (Gjerde 1985,
Kamphoefner 1987, Bodnar 1985).
Once an ethnic group had established a \toe-hold" (Thistlethwaite 1991) or a \beach-
head" (Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982) in a particular industry or location, it was essential
to maintain and even consolidate that presence. Conzen (1976) describes the competition
(and con
ict) between Irish and German immigrants when Milwaukee was being settled.
And the following quote from a Polish immigrant well describes the ethnic competition that
very likely was a feature of most labor markets at the time, \You take in the erection depart-
ment { it was mostly all Slavs ... Not Slovaks, it was Polish ... We didn't have Lithuanians
there and the Russians were not involved there ... Now if a Russian got his job in a shear
department ... he's looking for a buddy, a Russian buddy. He's not going to look for a
6Croatian buddy. And if he see the boss looking for a man he says, `Look, I have a good
man,' and he's picking out his friends" (Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982:62). Given the
variety of economic opportunities in the United States, individuals and small groups drawn
from the same parish in Europe often had an incentive to move and seek employment in new
locations. The stability of the local community in the United States, based on a common
national origin rather than narrower social aliations, was thus essential for the viability of
the labor market network. Because ex post social sanctions would have little impact once the
individual or small group had moved, a more eective strategy would have been to discourage
exit ex ante. As discussed below, the incentive to invest in the activities and social inter-
actions that were needed to build community ties would have been greater in fractionalized
locations characterized by greater labor market competition between ethnic groups.
2.2 Identity Formation
Theories of group identity in the social sciences can be broadly divided into two categories:
(1) contact theory in which diversity fosters inter-group tolerance and weakens in-group
identity, and (2) con
ict theory in which diversity strengthens in-group identity, while at the
same time increasing prejudice towards other groups (Putnam 2007). Among these theories,
con
ict theory has received a disproportionate share of research attention and empirical
support in the social science literature. Central to this theory is the in-group versus out-
group dichotomy rst proposed by Sumner (1906). Competition between groups over scarce
resources is seen to give rise to greater in-group identication (Ragin 1979, Giles and Evans
1986).
Why does inter-group competition give rise to in-group identity? Much of the social
psychology literature appears to treat in-group identity formation as a by-product of com-
petition between groups (Brewer and Brown 1998). In contrast, Bisin et al. (2008) develop
a model in which identity is instilled purposefully in response to inter-group competition. In
their model, there is a cost to interacting with or competing with members of other groups,
which is decreasing in the share of the individual's own group in the population. In-group
identity reduces this cost, which implies that smaller groups will have a greater incentive to
invest in these values.
Although the motivation for identity formation in Bisin et al. (2008) is psychological,
economic incentives can also give rise to identity. Based on the preceding description of the
early development of the Midwest, consider a local labor market with N migrant workers
drawn from M ethnic groups. These workers are competing for a limited number of perma-
nent jobs, which provide surplus R. Because members of an ethnic network provide referrals
for each other, larger networks will capture a greater share of the surplus. Tullock's (1980)
canonical model of rent seeking can be conveniently adapted to this setting to describe the









where ni is the number of workers belonging to group i, nj is the corresponding number of
workers from each group j 6= i, and  > 0.3 Dierentiating with respect to ni, and assuming
that all group sizes are equal, ni = nj = N=M, the cost to group i from the exit of its













which is increasing in the number of groups, M. Conditional on the number of workers N
and the surplus R, a decline in the share of each group, 1=M, is associated with a greater
marginal cost of exit regardless of whether the returns to group-size are increasing ( > 1)
or decreasing ( < 1) at the margin.
Self-interested individuals do not internalize the cost imposed on the rest of the group
by their exit from the local market. One way for recently established local communities to
have aligned such exit more closely with the socially optimal level when the Midwest was
rst developing would have been to invest in the activities and social interactions that give
rise to identity, since attachment to the home community increases the individual's exit-cost.
If there is a xed cost to coordinating the eorts of many individuals when making these
investments, the probability that identity would have emerged would have been greater in
locations where each group accounted for a relatively small share of the population.
If groups were of equal size, in-group identity would have been more likely to emerge in
locations or counties with more ethnic groups and, hence, greater inter-group competition. If







would measure concentration, which is inversely related to competition. One
minus the Herndahl index yields a well known measure of fractionalization, which would
be associated with greater inter-group competition and in-group identity in the county as a
whole.
Recent empirical evidence from diverse settings is consistent with the hypothesis that
in-group identity is negatively correlated with a group's share of the population. Bisin,
Topa, and Verdier (2004) use the General Social Survey to show that parents belonging to
religious minority communities in a geographical area put more eort into socializing their
children. Bisin et al. (2008) use data from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities
(FESNEM) in the United Kingdom, which contains detailed information on ethnic identity,
to document the same negative correlation between identity and the share of the respondents'
3Tullock's specication is identical to the equation above except that the number of individuals is replaced
by the investment in rent seeking.
8ethnic group in the local population. Abramitzky, Einav and Rigbi (forthcoming) show that
Jewish-related expenditure on Hanukkah is higher in U.S. counties with a lower share of
Jews. Finally, Fryer (forthcoming), using data from the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health (Add Health) nds that black and Hispanic students in schools that
are less than 20 percent black have the strongest sense of minority identity, measured by
the disapproval of behaviors associated with `Acting White' and academic achievement. In
a related analysis, blacks in less segregated schools incur a greater tradeo between peer
approval and academic achievement. Identity may have emerged in minority groups in
these applications to prevent acculturation, whereas competition between migrant (minority)
groups may have been more salient in our historical Midwestern setting. The important
message from these previous studies is that in-group identity can emerge endogenously in
response to external circumstances, as we assume in our analysis.
2.3 Measuring Initial Identity
The preceding description of the development of the Midwest establishes a point of departure
{ around 1860 { for the empirical analysis. Based on the discussion above, identity as we
have dened it is more likely to have emerged in this initial period in counties where the
labor market was ethnically fractionalized. To measure fractionalization in 1860, we need
information on ethnic shares in the occupation categories within which labor market compe-
tition occurred. Individual-level data, including characteristics such as age, sex, occupation,
and country of birth, are publicly available from the Population Census each decade from
1850 to 1930. Using the 1-in-100 sample from the 1860 IPUMS we can compute ethnic
fractionalization within broad occupational categories in each Midwestern county.
Table 1 describes the overall ethnic shares upon which the fractionalization measure is
based in 1860, 1880, and 1900. The English (13 percent), the Irish (25 percent), and the
Germans (32 percent), dominated the migrant population in the Midwest in 1860, when
initial conditions were being established, with no other ethnic group accounting for more
than a 3 percent share of the migrants in that year. Subsequently, the English and the
Irish were displaced by the Germans and the Scandinavians over the 1860-1900 period.
Notice that the Italians, Poles, and Slavs continue to be insignicant in 1900, although they
would display a substantial presence in Midwestern cities such as Cleveland, Chicago, and
Pittsburgh by the rst quarter of the twentieth century. Table 2 reports the occupational
distribution of the migrants from the IPUMS sample in the same census years. Although
agriculture was the dominant sector in this period, the share of farm employment declines
from 62 percent in 1860 to 48 percent in 1900, with manufacturing operatives and laborers
accounting for much of the increase in non-farm employment.
Figure 2 plots the fractionalization statistic based on the broad occupational categories in
9Table 2. Counties that were not incorporated and those without foreign-born workers in 1860
are unshaded in the Figure. The implicit assumption when constructing the fractionalization
statistic is that individuals can switch occupations within but not across categories and that
migrant workers are restricted to a distinct segment of the labor market. The weighted
average of fractionalization within each occupational category, where the weight is measured
by the share of migrants in that category, then provides us with an overall measure of ethnic
fractionalization in the county. For example, suppose that there are two occupations and
two ethnicities in the county, with complete occupational segregation along ethnic lines. Our
measure of fractionalization will be zero in this case, correctly re
ecting the absence of ethnic
competition in this labor market. In contrast, if the two ethnicities are of equal size and
evenly distributed across the two occupations, our measure of fractionalization will increase
to 0.5. The fractionalization statistic that we will use in the empirical analysis has a mean
of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2 across the seven Midwest states in Figure 2.
While there may be a connection between historical fractionalization and initial identity
in theory, is there sucient variation in 1860 fractionalization to predict outcomes many years
in the future? To answer this question we regressed church participation at the county-level
from 1870 to 2000, available at roughly ten-year intervals from the CRB, on 1860 fraction-
alization and a parsimonious set of variables meant to capture relevant economic conditions
in 1860 (discussed below). The coecient on 1860 fractionalization, together with the 95
percent condence band, from these regressions is plotted in each year in Figure 3. This
coecient is less precisely estimated in the early census years, but is positive and signicant
by 1890. Subsequently, it grows steadily larger, while remaining statistically signicant, all
the way through to 2000. The 1860 fractionalization statistic is based on migrant workers
who comprised less than 15 percent of the population in that year. Nevertheless, we see
that historical fractionalization has a strong and persistent eect on an outcome { church
participation { that is closely associated with identity in our analysis.
3 The Model
The model developed in this section uses identity, dened as the attachment to the birth
community, to (i) explain the persistent dierences in church participation observed in Figure
3, and (ii) generate predictions for variation in occupational choice across spatial communities
that are otherwise indistinguishable.
3.1 Individuals and Communities
There are two types of communities, type-1 communities in which a fraction t of the pop-
ulation is instilled with identity in period t, and type-2 communities without identity. In
10our Midwestern context, the probability that a community is a type-1 community would be
increasing in historical fractionalization. There are  type-1 communities and 1    type-2
communities in this economy, with a continuum of individuals with measure one in each
community. Each individual lives for two periods and has a single child at the beginning
of the second period, preserving the size of the population over time. Each individual is
endowed with ability !  U[0;1]. Ability does not vary systematically across communities
and within families is uncorrelated across generations.
Each individual must make two choices in her lifetime. At the beginning of the second
period she must decide whether or not to participate in the single collective institution, such
as the church, that is active in her community. The cost of participation cp! is increasing
linearly in the individual's ability. This could be because more able (intelligent) individuals
are less sociable, or because the opportunity cost of participation is higher for them. Larger
collective institutions provide more services for their members. The direct benet from
participation for any individual in period t, +g!t, is thus assumed to be increasing linearly
in the measure of the community !t that chooses to participate. In addition, the collective
institution serves as a vehicle through which individuals are socialized. The child of any
individual who participates in this institution in type-1 communities will develop identity
with probability  2 (0;1]. As in Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Tabellini (2008) we assume
that an individual with identity would like her child to share these values. She thus derives
additional utility UI from participation.4
Individuals must also make career choices at the beginning of the second period of their
lives. Two types of jobs are available in this economy: skilled jobs and unskilled jobs.
Individuals who select into the skilled occupation must invest in human capital. The cost of
this investment, ce(1 !), declines linearly in ability and is incurred instantaneously before
commencing work. Apart from training costs and wages, the two types of occupations are
distinguished by the level of spatial mobility. There is an idiosyncratic aspect to skilled
jobs, which implies that skilled workers must move to specic locations to ll match-specic
positions. For example, university professors or management consultants move throughout
their careers, across local and regional labor markets, as their ability is revealed to the
market and new opportunities arise. In contrast, medical technicians or janitors are less
likely to move to further their careers (conditional on remaining in the same occupation).
Skilled workers therefore move with probability PS during the second period of their lives
in the model, whereas unskilled workers move with probability PNS < PS. We will verify
4Bisin and Verdier assume that  is a choice variable, determined at the level of the family in each
generation. We assume instead that the decision to invest in the activities and the social interactions that
are needed for identity formation is made at the level of the community in the initial period (outside the
model). Once this decision is made, identity is transmitted with xed probability  in all the generations
that follow in type-1 communities.
11below that occupations with higher levels of college completion are indeed associated with
greater migration.5 Individuals with identity suer disutility when they leave their birth
community, and we will see momentarily that this aects the allocation of individuals to
jobs in equilibrium.
3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
While we allow for uncertainty in job location at the individual level, there is no uncertainty
at the level of the local labor market in this economy. There are !NS unskilled jobs and
1   !NS skilled jobs to be lled in each spatial community in each period. Because the
cost of investing in human capital is declining in ability, there is an ability threshold above
which individuals select into the skilled occupation in each community. Let this threshold
be !e




t for individuals with and without identity in
type-1 communities. These thresholds will be set so that the supply of skilled and unskilled
labor in the economy matches the demand in each period. The market clearing condition
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The supply and the demand for skilled labor will match by construction if this condition is
satised.6
To derive the allocation of individuals to jobs across communities, we assume that the
labor market functions competitively in this economy. Aggregate labor demand and, hence,
total output is constant in each period. The First Welfare Theorem can thus be applied
to derive the ability threshold in each type of community, without characterizing individual
decisions or solving explicitly for wages, as the solution to the Central Planner's Problem
of minimizing moving costs and training costs (for skilled workers). The solution to this
problem yields our rst result:
Proposition 1.A smaller share of the population born in type-1 communities selects into the
skilled occupation and, therefore, migrates in each period despite the fact that the availability
of skilled jobs does not vary across communities.
5These results are obtained in 2000 and it is possible that the correlation between skill and mobility was
reversed (negative) in the nineteenth century when new areas in the United States were developing. Because
the labor market equilibrium is derived independently in each period in the model, this does not aect its
predictions for current occupational choice.
6Although the market-clearing condition ensures that the supply matches the demand for each type of
worker in this economy, the Central Planner must in addition sort the migrants so that !NS unskilled
workers and (1   !NS) skilled workers end up ex post in each community. We will see below that the
supply of unskilled (skilled) workers exceeds the demand ex ante in type-1 (type-2) communities. To sort





t ]  !NS (ii) (1 PS)(1 !e
t)  (1 !NS). These conditions will be satised
if PS, PNS are suciently large.
12Let cI be the cost of moving for individuals with identity. Normalize so that the cost






























The rst term in the expression above represents the cost of moving for individuals with
identity in type-1 communities. The second and third terms represent training costs in type-





t , subject to the market-clearing condition (which eectively reduces the problem to



















t ) will be strictly smaller than the measure of skilled workers
supplied by type-2 communities (1   !e
t) if t > 0. We will show below that the fraction
of the population instilled with identity in type-1 communities t is indeed positive in all
periods to complete the proof.
3.3 Institutional Participation
The cost of participation in the collective institution is declining in ability and so there is an
ability threshold below which individuals choose to participate. There is a strategic element
to the individual's participation decision since it depends on the participation decisions of
other individuals in the community. The threshold is thus the solution to a xed point prob-
lem, which we solve below. Let this threshold be !
p





for individuals with and without identity in type-1 communities. We make two assumptions
to simplify the analysis that follows:
A1. First generation migrants, who arrive in a community as a consequence of job
turnover, do not participate in the collective institution. This assumption emphasizes the
cost to a community from migration.












t in each period. This implies that only unskilled workers participate
in the collective institution, allowing us to solve for the labor market equilibrium and the
participation equilibrium independently. We will discuss the consequences of relaxing this
assumption below.
Given these assumptions, it is straightforward to derive the participation threshold in
each type of community at each point in time. Starting with type-2 communities, the
13participation threshold !
p
t must satisfy the following equality,




t = 0: (1)
The left hand side of equation (1) describes the utility from participation for the marginal
individual with ability !
p
t who is indierent between participating and not participating. For
such indierence to be obtained, the following condition must be satised:
Condition 1: cp   g(1   PNS) > 0:
The (1 PNS) multiplier in equation (1) re
ects the fact, from assumptions A1 and A2, that
only individuals who selected into the unskilled occupation and remain in their birth com-
munity participate in the collective institution. Collecting terms, the participation threshold
in type-2 communities !
p
t is constant over time,
!t =

cp   g(1   PNS)
: (2)





t must satisfy the following equalities,










t = 0 (3)















t only dier because individuals instilled with identity derive ad-
ditional utility UI from participation, since their children will then share their values with
probability . Dierencing equation (3) from equation (4), and then substituting the result-
ing expression for !
p;I




















cp   g(1   PNS)
t: (6)
The thresholds derived above fully characterize participation decisions in type-1 and type-2
communities.
3.4 Identity and Participation Dynamics
Ability is uncorrelated across generations within the family and the benet derived from
the collective institution is determined by contemporaneous participation decisions. What
links one generation to the next in a community is identity and the utility that individuals
with identity derive when their children share their values. Because children of participating
14individuals in type-1 communities develop identity with probability , identity evolves in
those communities according to the following law of motion:









The (1   PNS) multiplier in equation (7) re
ects the fact that participation is restricted to
individuals who remain int their birth community and select into the unskilled occupation
(from assumptions A1 and A2). The result that follows describes how the evolution of
identity, as derived above, shapes participation in type-1 and type-2 communities.
Proposition 2.There exists a  and a , such that for  <  and 0 < , (a) the share of
the population instilled with identity in type-1 communities grows monotonically over time
until it converges to its steady-state level. (b) Participation in the collective institution is
always greater in type-1 communities and the gap between type-1 and type-2 communities
widens over time until the steady-state is reached.
Substituting the expression for !
p;I
t from equation (5), and subsequently the expression
for !
p;NI
t from equation (6), in equation (7),
t+1 = (1   PNS)
"
UI
cp   g(1   PNS)
t +

cp   g(1   PNS)
#
: (8)
Equation (8) describes a rst-order linear one-dimensional dynamical system. The properties
of such a system are well known and the system will converge to a unique steady-state




cp   g(1   PNS)
< 1
Condition 2 will be satised if  is less than a critical , given the other parameter values,
as stated in the Proposition. Intuitively, a smaller transmission probability  slows down
the diusion of identity through the population, ensuring that the dynamical system is well
behaved. For the steady-state  to lie in the unit interval, we need a stronger condition,
which is derived by setting t = t+1 =  in equation (8):
Condition 3:
(UI + )(1   PNS)
cp   g(1   PNS)
< 1
Starting with a small 0 also ensures that identity will increase over time. If 0 < , as
specied in Proposition 2, then it follows from equation (8) that the state variable t will
increase monotonically over time as it converges to the steady-state  to complete part (a)
of Proposition 2. This also implies that t is positive at each point in time to complete the
proof of Proposition 1.
15Having established that t increases monotonically over time before converging to its
steady-state level if  and 0 are suciently small, the next step is to compare participa-




t from equation (5). Because




t from equation (2) and equation (6). Participation in type-1 communi-








is the weighted average of two terms that are both
larger than participation in type-2 communities (1 PNS)!
p
t. It follows that participation in
type-1 communities will be greater than participation in type-2 communities at each point
in time. This dierence in participation is eectively driven by the UI term in equation
(4), which induces greater participation by individuals with identity and, by extension, in-
dividuals without identity in type-1 communities. Moreover, while participation in type-2
communities is constant over time from equation (2), participation in type-1 communities
increases monotonically until t converge to its steady-state level. Returning to the partici-
pation expression, there are two reasons for this increase over time. First, !
p;NI
t is increasing
in t from equation (6), which implies from equation (5) that !
p;I
t is increasing in t as well.




t will be increasing over time from part (a) of the Propo-
sition. Second, the weight t on !
p;I
t is increasing over time, whereas the weight (1   t)
on the smaller term !
p;NI
t is decreasing over time. The gap in participation between type-1
and type-2 communities will thus widen over time until the dynamical system reaches the
steady-state to complete the proof of Proposition 2.
3.5 Persistence without Identity
Persistent dierences across communities in the supply of skilled labor (Proposition 1) and
institutional participation (Proposition 2) are driven by identity in our model. Could these
dierences be generated by dierences in institutional quality alone? If assumption A2 is
satised, then any change in institutional participation (quality) is inframarginal and will
have no eect on the Central Planner's labor allocation decision. We thus proceed to relax
assumption A2 by allowing the participation threshold to lie to the right of the job threshold.
Without identity, institutional participation in each type of community, c = f1;2g, will then
satisfy the condition,
 + g [(1   PNS)!
e;c
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Bc is a function of !
p;c
t , which in turn is a function of !
e;c
t and so the Central Planner's labor
allocation decision is no longer independent of institutional participation. Without identity,
moving costs are the same in all communities. Normalizing so that moving costs are zero
























































t . Relaxing assumption A2 does not, by itself, generate
dierences in institutional participation and the labor allocation across communities. Once
we depart from linearity and introduce increasing returns to scale in the benets that the




t will no longer be linear
and dierences across communities will emerge in equilibrium. The Central Planner can
now increase the overall benet from institutional participation by shifting the job threshold
to the right in some communities, say the type-1 communities, with an accompanying shift
in the threshold to the left in type-2 communities (to clear the market). This increase
in benets will be partially oset by the accompanying increase in overall training costs




t , but it is straightforward to verify
that job thresholds and participation thresholds will not be the same across communities in
equilibrium, providing an alternative explanation for Propositions 1 and 2.7
While increasing returns to scale can explain dierences in the supply of skilled labor
and institutional participation across communities in principle, this assumption is dicult to
justify theoretically or empirically in the Midwest. Individual inputs in the church, such as
volunteering and making charitable contributions, are substitutes rather than complements.
With the recent exception of mega-churches, which are relatively rare in the Midwest, there is
little evidence of the market concentration that would accompany increasing returns to scale
in the church's production function either. By the same argument, we would not expect to
observe increasing returns to scale in supporting institutions such as parochial schools or in
7Without accounting for participation in the collective institution and setting moving costs to be the




t is the optimal allocation. Once we
add institutional participation to the Central Planner's objective function, marginal shifts away from this
allocation will have a rst-order eect on the benets from participation (with increasing returns to scale)
but only a second-order eect on training costs.
17the labor-market networks that were historically connected to the church.8 Could persistent
dierences be generated by relaxing assumption A1 instead? Let the benet provided by
the collective institution to all residents be B1 in type-1 communities and B2 < B1 in type-2
communities. It is straightforward to verify that these dierences in institutional quality
will have no eect on the solution to the Central Planner's problem. The labor allocation
decision will only be aected if individuals place a premium on participating in the specic
institution located in their hometown, which is the case with identity.
4 Empirical Analysis
Based on the discussion in Section 2, fractionalization in 1860 can be interpreted as being
positively associated with the probability that a county is a type-1 community. This allows
Propositions 1 and 2 and the assumptions that are needed to test the theory to be restated
in terms of 1860 fractionalization. In particular, we will estimate the eect of 1860 fraction-
alization on (i) participation over time in specic socializing institutions associated with the
transmission of identity, and (ii) occupational choice and mobility many years in the future.
We will also provide support for the assumptions that 1860 fractionalization is uncorrelated
with standard determinants of occupational choice today such as the availability of skilled
jobs, the ability distribution in the population, and school quality. The analysis concludes
by assessing the robustness of the main results.
4.1 Historical Fractionalization and Current County Characteris-
tics
A suitable research setting for our analysis must satisfy two conditions: (i) there must be
sucient variation in fractionalization across spatial communities or counties in the initial
period when the economy in this setting is rst developing and institutions are being estab-
lished, and (ii) historical fractionalization must be uncorrelated with standard determinants
of occupational choice today. The preliminary results presented in Figure 3 indicate that our
measure of fractionalization satises the rst condition. We now proceed to provide support
for the second condition. More stringent tests will be discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Labor market networks organized around the European-origin countries in Table 2 are no
longer salient in the American Midwest (Gans 1979, Alba 1990). However, fractionalization
in 1860 could have been correlated with other features of the economy at the time of initial
8Returning to the linear technology, an alternative mechanism to generate persistent dierences with-
out identity would relax the assumption that  is the same across communities. If historically fractional-
ized communities, which are type-1 communities in the model, invested more heavily in xed institutional
characteristics that have a permanent eect on participation, then this would imply that 1 > 2. It is




t , which is inconsistent with
the empirical results.
18development that had persistent eects. To explore this possibility, we must understand what
determined fractionalization in the rst place. In a rapidly expanding Midwest economy,
some of the variation in fractionalization across counties was no doubt a consequence of
accidental initial settlement by ethnic groups in particular locations, which fueled the arrival
of more migrants as networks crystallized. At the same time, fractionalization would have
been determined by the demand for labor, with more ethnic groups attracted to rapidly
growing areas. We have already discussed the importance of transportation links in the
development of the Midwest and Table 3 consequently investigates the eect of railroads
and distance to canals and a Great Lakes harbor on fractionalization in 1860.9 Counties
with a railroad running through them and counties that are closer to a canal or harbor have
signicantly higher fractionalization in Table 3, Column 1 as well as a larger population in
Column 4.
The results in Table 3 indicate that counties with superior transportation infrastructure,
which were more populated and presumably growing more rapidly, were more fractionalized
in 1860. The population of the county in 1860 could have determined subsequent agglomer-
ation in economic activity, with long-term implications for the growth of the local economy
and the demand for skilled labor. Recall, however, that the eect of fractionalization on
identity derived in Section 2.2 is conditional on the number of workers, N, and the total
surplus, R. All the empirical tests that follow in the paper will consequently estimate the
eect of 1860 fractionalization conditional on N and R, although we verify that the main
results go through unconditionally as well. The total surplus, R, will in general depend on
the size of the local economy and the types of jobs that are available. The total number
of migrant workers competing for this surplus, N, will be positively correlated with the to-
tal population. Using the county population in 1860 and the share of manufacturing and
agriculture in that year to jointly measure N and R, we see in Table 4, Columns 1-3 that
1860 fractionalization (conditional on county characteristics in that year) is uncorrelated
with characteristics of the economy in 1990, such as the share of agriculture, share of man-
ufacturing, and the total population (as well as population density, not reported) that are
associated with the availability of skilled jobs.
Given the high levels of mobility in the United States, few individuals living in the Mid-
west today could trace an unbroken line of descent to European ancestors arriving in the
same county at the time of initial settlement. Not surprisingly, 1860 fractionalization is
uncorrelated with (white) ethnic fractionalization in 1990 in Column 4. Even if 1860 frac-
tionalization was correlated with the ability distribution among the initial migrants, it is
9Data on the distance to the nearest canal (or navigable river) and the nearest Great Lakes harbor
is obtained from Jordan Rappaport's website at the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank. The distance is
computed in each case from the county centroid.
19thus unlikely to be correlated with the current distribution of ability in the population and
we will later observe that test scores are indeed uncorrelated with 1860 fractionalization.
However, we must also consider the possibility that 1860 fractionalization could be corre-
lated with school quality today. Although con
ict theory predicts that fractionalization will
strengthen in-group identity, it also predicts that diversity will increase out-group prejudice.
The negative eects of fractionalization on inter-group cooperation and, hence, public good
provision have been extensively documented. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), for ex-
ample, document a negative and signicant relationship between racial fractionalization and
the allocation of resources to local public goods, including education, in the United States.
An important advantage of measuring fractionalization as early as 1860 is that public
infrastructure was relatively rudimentary at that time, limiting the negative consequences
of inter-group competition. Depending on subsequent migration, ethnic fractionalization
in 1860 could nevertheless be correlated with ethnic or racial fractionalization later in the
twentieth century when it was relevant for public good provision. Reassuringly, 1860 frac-
tionalization is uncorrelated with racial fractionalization in 1990 in Column 5 and we will
later observe that 1860 fractionalization is also uncorrelated with education expenditures per
student (and total public expenditures per capita). Notice, in contrast, that more ethnically
fractionalized counties in 1860 have signicantly lower religious fractionalization in 1990 in
Column 6.10 This intriguing result, which stands conspicuously apart from the other results
reported in Table 4 serves as a useful preview for the analysis of church participation that
follows.
4.2 Church Participation
Proposition 2 states that 1860 fractionalization should have a positive eect on participation
in the collective institution, with this eect growing stronger over time. Although the model
assumes that a single institution is available to transmit identity from period-0 onwards,
multiple socializing institutions co-exist in practice. We focus on the church in our analysis
because it was among the rst institutions to be established when immigrants arrived in
an area (Hoerder 1991, Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982). \[Migrants] from varying regions
formed a community based on common nationality and religion centered on the central
10The manufacturing share in 1990 is dened as the share of the civilian labor force employed in manu-
facturing in that year. The agriculture share in 1990 is computed using the farm population and the total
population in the county in that year. All these statistics, as well as the area of each county used to compute
the population density, are obtained from the 1994 County Data Book, compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. Ethnic fractionalization is computed from the 1990 IPUMS as one minus the Herndahl index of
ethnic concentration, using the same 16 white ethnic groups as in Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004). Racial
fractionalization and religious fractionalization are computed from the 1990 IPUMS and the 1990 Census
of Religious Bodies, respectively, using the same ve racial groups and the same 18 religious groups as in
Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby.
20cultural institution { the church" (Gjerde 1991: 176). This institution would thus have been
well situated to instill identity that discouraged migration by its members, where required,
when communities in the Midwest were rst being established.
Historically, the church congregation provided many forms of mutual assistance includ-
ing credit, insurance, job referrals, business information, and social support (Gjerde 1985,
Alexander 1991). Indeed, it has been argued that early immigrants to the Midwest partici-
pated in church communities to benet from the economic and social services they provided,
instead of being drawn to the church by a particular belief or ideology (Bodnar 1985). The
Midwestern church continues to provide important forms of social support for its members.
Church activities include Sunday school service, youth groups, pot-lucks, informal home
parties, and food, visits, and other forms of support when members of the congregation are
ailing or inrm. The church also lies at the center of a cluster of inter-linked civic institu-
tions, including the school and various voluntary organizations, that emerged over time. Life
in a Midwest community revolves around these institutions, which bring families and friends
together on a regular basis (Elder and Conger 2000). Although other institutions, such as
parochial schools, will also play a role in building an attachment to the hometown, we focus
on the church in the analysis that follows because of its central position in community life and
because church participation data are available at the county level, by denomination, from
the Census of Religious Bodies (CRB) at roughly ten-year intervals from period 0 (1860) till
the present (2000).11 Additional supporting results based on enrollment in parochial schools
will be provided in Section 4.3.
Based on the CRB data, church participation in the Midwest has remained at roughly
55 percent of the population over the 1860-2000 period. However, this stability masks
substantial variation in the mix of denominations over time. Five denominations { Baptist,
Catholic, Lutheran, Methodist, and Presbyterian { account for roughly 80 percent of church
participants over the 1860-2000 period. Among these denominations, the Catholics and
Lutherans grew substantially in popularity, accounting for 33 percent and 20 percent of all
church participants by 2000, while the other denominations (especially the Methodists and
Presbyterians) faced a corresponding decline.
Given our focus on historical competition between migrant groups, we expect churches
that were dominated by migrants to have played an especially important role in creating
identity, as we have dened it. Based on the country of origin of the incoming migrants,
reported in Table 1, most of the migrant churches would have been Catholic or Lutheran.12
11The CRB was conducted as part of the population census from 1860 to 1890, with census enumerators
collecting information from individual churches in each county. Subsequently, the U.S. Bureau of the Census
conducted the CRB separately from the population census in ten-year intervals from 1906 to 1936. Starting
from 1952, the National Council of Churches of Christ undertook the responsibility of conducting the CRB,
with subsequent census rounds in 1972, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
12Apart from the Germans and the Irish, the English were also an important migrant group in 1860.
21Regressing the population-share of dierent denominations in 1860, obtained from the CRB,
on the share of migrants in that year, obtained from the population census, counties with
a greater share of migrants are indeed disproportionately Catholic and Lutheran. Although
we have shown in Figure 3 that 1860 fractionalization has a positive eect on overall church
participation, a stronger test of Proposition 2 is that its predictions should apply to the
migrant denominations alone. While the pool of potential members in those denominations
would have been restricted to particular ethnicities to begin with, this constraint would have
been subsequently relaxed, allowing identity to propagate through the population. Higher
1860 fractionalization should thus be associated with a greater population share of Catholics
and Lutherans and this eect should grow stronger over time. In contrast, the model has no
prediction for the relationship between historical fractionalization and participation in other
denominations over time, providing us with a useful falsication test.13 We consequently
proceed to estimate two separate regressions in each census year; the rst regression has the
share of Lutherans and Catholics in the population as the dependent variable and the second
regression has the share of all other denominations as the dependent variable.
Using the same regression specication as in Figure 3, with county population, agri-
culture share, and manufacturing share in 1860 as additional regressors to account for the
total surplus (R) and the relevant labor force (N) in the initial period, the 1860 fractional-
ization coecient, with the corresponding 95 percent condence band, is reported in each
census year in Figure 4. As predicted, the eect of 1860 fractionalization on the share of
Catholics and Lutherans in the population is positive and signicant, and gets steadily larger
over time.14 Although we do not report results separately by denomination, this pattern is
obtained for both the Catholics and the Lutherans. A one standard deviation increase in
1860 fractionalization would increase the population share of Catholics and Lutherans in
the county by four percentage points (22 percent) in 2000. In contrast, the fractionalization
coecient is much smaller and negative, but remains signicant and stable over time in the
companion regressions for the other denominations.15 These results, taken together, provide
Although it is possible that many of the English were Anglican (Episcopalian), this denomination accounts
for just 3 percent of church participants in 1860 and never has a signicant presence in the Midwest.
13The direct eect of stronger Catholic and Lutheran churches is to lower participation in other denom-
inations. However, the endogenous response by other denominations and the accompanying increase in
religious competition could at the same time increase overall church participation (Finke and Stark 1992,
Gruber 2005). The net eect on participation in other denominations is consequently ambiguous.
14The 1860-1890 census rounds collected information on the number of church seats by denomination in
each county. From 1890 onwards, information was collected on the number of members directly, and from
1972 onwards the number of adherents was collected as well. We use church seats rather than members to
measure participation in 1890 because it is more in line with trends in participation over time and we use
adherents rather than members to measure participation in the 1972-2000 census rounds because membership
information for the Catholics is unavailable in that period. The fractionalization coecient increases steadily
over time and not in three distinct steps, so our results are unlikely to be driven by changes in the participation
measure.
15We do not report the fractionalization coecient in 1860 in Figures 3 and 4 for expositional convenience.
22strong support for the model and an explanation for the negative correlation between ethnic
fractionalization in 1860 and religious fractionalization in 1990 that we reported in Table 4.
The CRB data only allow us to measure church participation among the current residents
of the county, whereas the theory is based on the assumption that individuals born in type-
1 communities are more likely to be exposed to socializing institutions in childhood. We
consequently turn to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which consists
of a nationally representative sample of American high school seniors in 1979 who were
subsequently interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially thereafter. The NLSY
collects information on the respondents' county of birth and the religious denomination they
were raised in.
The dependent variable in Table 5, Column 1 is the share of Catholics and Lutherans in
the county, while the dependent variable in Column 2 is the share of all other denominations,
using CRB data in 2000. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the fraction of individuals
born in a given county who were raised as Catholics or Lutherans, using NLSY data. And
the dependent variable in Column 4 is the corresponding fraction raised in all other denom-
inations. To be consistent with the results using the CRB, we aggregate the individual data
in the NLSY to the county level. The regressors in all columns include 1860 fractionalization,
manufacturing share, agriculture share, and population in that county. Matching the pat-
terns in Columns 1-2, and in Figure 4 over many census years, we see that individuals born
in historically fractionalized counties are signicantly more likely to be raised as Lutherans
or Catholics in Column 3, whereas the coecient on 1860 fractionalization in Column 4 is
negative (but insignicant).16
4.3 Occupational Choice and Mobility
Proposition 1 states that individuals born in historically fractionalized counties should be
more likely to select into low-skill jobs associated with low mobility. The NLSY is uniquely
suited to test this prediction because the county of birth is available for each individual in
the nationally representative sample of high school seniors, as well as residential location
and the type of job (where relevant) from 1979 onwards. We will study the (conditional)
eect of 1860 fractionalization on migration and the type of job in 2000, when respondents
This coecient for the non-migrant denominations is substantially more negative than what we see for the
other years in Figure 4 and its inclusion would obscure changes in the fractionalization coecient over time
that we observe in the Figures. The coecient in 1860 for the migrant denominations is negative, but is
small in magnitude and statistically insignicant.
16Our explanation for the pattern observed in Figure 4 and Table 5 is that identity is propagating through
the population over time in historically fractionalized counties, increasing participation in socializing insti-
tutions. An alternative explanation is that Catholics and Lutherans have been migrating into historically
fractionalized counties over time. Without a role for identity, such selective migration even if it was a re-
sponse to superior local institutions, would not explain the mismatch between the supply and the availability
of skilled jobs in historically fractionalized counties, as discussed in Section 3 and shown below.
23were old enough to be settled in their careers and to have made job related moves.
Including 1860 manufacturing share, agriculture share, and population to account for the
total surplus (R) and the labor force (N) in the initial period, as well as the individual's
race, gender, and age as regressors, we see in Table 6, Column 1 that individuals born in
historically fractionalized counties are signicantly less likely to have migrated from their
county of birth by 2000. On average, 58 percent of the individuals in the sample migrate
from the county of birth. The 1860 fractionalization coecient in Column 1 indicates that a
one standard deviation increase in fractionalization would reduce migration by 8 percentage
points (14 percent).
To test the accompanying prediction that individuals born in historically fractionalized
counties will select into less mobile low-skill jobs, we compute the average migration rate
within each occupation in the NLSY. The rate corresponding to the individual's occupa-
tion in 2000 (conditional on being employed) is then specied as the dependent variable in
Column 2. Using the same set of regressors as in Column 1, we see that the 1860 fractional-
ization coecient is indeed negative and signicant, as predicted by the theory. In a related
exercise, the dependent variable is measured by average college completion in the individual's
occupation in Column 3. Migration and college completion are strongly correlated across
occupations (the correlation is 0.6) as assumed in the model. Not surprisingly, the 1860
fractionalization coecient is negative and signicant in Column 3 as well.
The results in Table 6, Columns 1-3 are consistent with the proposition that identity,
as we have dened it, reduces the individual's propensity to migrate, with implications for
occupational choice. We complete the analysis in this section by testing the assumption that
the availability of skilled jobs does not vary across types of communities.17 If this assumption
is satised, then individuals residing in historically fractionalized counties should hold the
same type of jobs as individuals residing in historically less fractionalized counties once the
market clears. The dependent variable in Table 6, Column 4 is the average migration rate in
the individual's occupation, as in Column 2. However, the 1860 variables are now measured
in the individual's county of residence rather than in the county of birth. Reassuringly,
the 1860 fractionalization coecient in Column 4 is much smaller in magnitude than the
corresponding coecient in Column 2 and statistically indistinguishable from zero. When the
individual's occupation is measured by average college completion, the 1860 fractionalization
coecient in Column 5 actually changes sign and is positive and signicant (at the 10 percent
level). Individuals residing (and working) in historically fractionalized counties are engaged
in occupations that are at least as skilled and as mobile as the occupations available to
17If occupation-specic human capital is transmitted from the parent to the child, then training costs
would be eectively lower for individuals born in counties with a greater availability of skilled jobs. The
supply of skilled labor would then be greater in those counties, without a role for identity.
24individuals in historically less fractionalized counties, consistent with the preliminary results
reported in Table 4.
4.4 Human Capital
We have focussed on the church in the analysis of institutional participation because this
institution has occupied a central position in community life from the time the Midwest
was developed. Indeed, the importance of the church is a common thread running through
historical accounts of the settlement of this region. Other institutions, such as parochial
schools, that subsequently formed around the church would also have contributed to building
community ties. The prediction from the theory is that individuals born in historically
fractionalized counties are more likely to have been exposed to these socializing institutions
in childhood as well. This section thus begins by estimating the (conditional) relationship
between enrollment in parochial school and 1860 fractionalization.
The 1970 and 1980 population censuses provide county-level information on the total
number of children enrolled in school (grades K-12) as well as the number of children en-
rolled in parochial schools (which are mostly Catholic and Lutheran in the Midwest). The
dependent variable in Table 7, Column 1 is the share of students enrolled in parochial schools
in 1970, while the dependent variable in Column 2 is the corresponding share in 1980. The
regressors in both specications are 1860 fractionalization, manufacturing share, agriculture
share, and population. The 1860 fractionalization coecient is positive and signicant and
nearly identical in Columns 1 and 2. The share of students in parochial school is 0.08 on
average across our Midwestern counties. The estimates in Columns 1-2 indicate that a one
standard deviation increase in 1860 fractionalization would increase that share by 0.014 (20
percent).
The 1990 census did not collect information on parochial schooling, but total private
school enrollment is available in all three census rounds. Parochial schools account for the
bulk of private schooling in the United States and, not surprisingly, the 1860 fractionalization
coecient continues to be positive and signicant with the share of students in private school
as the dependent variable (not reported). This coecient is just slightly larger in magnitude
than the point estimates in Columns 1-2 and remains very stable across the 1970-1990
census rounds. The results on parochial schooling, together with the results presented on
church participation and denominational aliation, indicate that individuals growing up
in historically fractionalized counties are more likely to come in contact with socializing
institutions. The consistency of the results on church participation, mobility, and parochial
school enrollment, obtained with three independent data sets, also increases our condence
in the model and the interpretation of the results.
We complete this section by providing support for the important assumption in the model
25that the cost of investing in human capital, re
ecting ability in the population or school
quality, should not be systematically higher in historically fractionalized counties.18 Previ-
ous research indicates that Catholic schools, which make up the bulk of parochial schools,
provide higher quality education than public schools (Evans and Schwab 1995, Altonji, El-
der, and Taber 2005). Since students in historically fractionalized counties are signicantly
more likely to be enrolled in parochial schools, this would suggest that they actually have
access to schools of superior quality. One concern, however, is that public schools in those
counties may consequently receive fewer resources, lowering overall school quality. To explore
this possibility, we match information on education expenditures from the Annual Survey
of Governments with total enrollment in public schools from the population census. The
dependent variable in Table 7, Columns 3-4 is constructed as the ratio of education expen-
ditures to public school students in each county in 1970 and 1980, respectively. Using the
same set of regressors as in Columns 1-2, we see that 1860 fractionalization has no eect
on public school expenditures. Results not reported indicate that 1860 fractionalization has
no eect on total public expenditures per capita either.19 Once again, we see that 1860
fractionalization has a signicant eect on specic (socializing) institutions alone.
The results presented in Table 7 provide no evidence that school quality is lower in
historically fractionalized counties. However, school quality is notoriously dicult to measure
and we must also allow for the possibility that the ability distribution varies across counties.
To provide direct support for the claim that individuals born in historically fractionalized
counties are no less capable and no less prepared to invest in the human capital that is
necessary to secure skilled jobs, we estimate the (conditional) relationship between measures
of educational attainment obtained from the NLSY and 1860 fractionalization in Table 8.
Conditional on 1860 manufacturing share, agriculture share, and population, as well as the
individual's age, gender, and race, we see in Table 8, Columns 1-3 that 1860 fractionalization
has no eect on AFQT scores, high school completion, and college completion.
Why are individuals born in historically fractionalized counties as likely to complete
college, even though they end up in less mobile occupations associated with lower college
completion? Apart from providing access to particular occupations, there are nonpecuniary
benets to college education. Given the results on parochial schooling in Table 7, one
reason why individuals born in historically fractionalized counties may be overqualied is
that school quality is higher in those counties, lowering the cost of investing further in
human capital. Regardless of the explanation, going beyond the model and allowing for
18It is straightforward to verify from the model that type-1 communities would supply more unskilled
workers, without a role for identity, if ce was higher or ability was lower in those communities.
19Using the same data, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) document a negative and signicant relationship
between contemporaneous racial fractionalization and the allocation of resources to certain public goods,
particularly education, roads, and welfare. Our ndings are not inconsistent with their results since we saw
in Table 4 that 1860 fractionalization was uncorrelated with 1990 racial fractionalization.
26multiple skilled jobs, we still expect college students from historically fractionalized counties
to make choices that will restrict their future mobility. To test this prediction, we compute
average migration within each college major listed in the NLSY. The average migration level
corresponding to the individual's major is then specied as the dependent variable in Table
8, Column 4. Using the same set of regressors as in Columns 1-3, we see that individuals
born in historically fractionalized counties select majors associated with signicantly lower
migration, as predicted, conditional on completing college.
4.5 Robustness Tests
We complete the empirical analysis by discussing a number of tests that were conducted to
assess the robustness of the results. Each test includes separate regressions with migration
in 2000 (Table 6, Column 1), the share of Lutherans and Catholics in the population in
2000 (Table 5, Column 1) and the share of children enrolled in parochial schools in 1980
(Table 7, Column 2) as the dependent variable. To preserve space, we only report the 1860
fractionalization coecient for each test in Table 9.
We begin in Panel A with alternative construction of the fractionalization variable.
Columns 1-6 report estimates with fractionalization measured at other points in time, 1850
and 1870, during the period of initial development. Subsequently, we increase the accuracy of
the fractionalization measure by excluding all counties with less than 20 observations in the
1860 IPUMS (approximately 10 percent of the sample) in Columns 7-9. Panel A concludes
by computing 1860 fractionalization with men only in Columns 10-12.20
Panel B continues with alternative construction of the fractionalization variable. Farmers
account for 50 percent of the 1860 workforce in Table 2. Ethnic competition may have been
less relevant in this occupational category and so we compute the fractionalization statistic
without farmers in Columns 1-3. The fractionalization statistic that we use in the regressions
reported in the paper is computed as the weighted average of ethnic fractionalization within
each of the 11 occupational categories listed in Table 2. Competition is assumed to occur
within a coarser set of four occupational categories in Columns 4-6 and fractionalization is
computed without regard to occupation in Columns 7-9.21 The implicit assumption when
computing the fractionalization statistic is that migrants compete with each other within
20Both men and women participated in the workforce in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
with ethnic networks channeling women into jobs as well (Bodnar 1980). We might nevertheless expect
labor networks to have been organized along gender lines within ethnic groups, and this robustness test
allows for the possibility that male networks occupied a dominant position in the labor market and the
communities they were drawn from.
21The four aggregate categories are white collar, agriculture, manufacturing, and service and laborers.
These categories correspond to the broad headings in Table 2 except that Blue collar, nonfarm is divided
into manufacturing (craftsman, operative) and service and laborers (household service, service, laborer non-
farm).
27a distinct segment of the labor market. The specication in Columns 10-12 relaxes this
assumption by including native workers as a separate group. Reassuringly, the 1860 frac-
tionalization coecient declines substantially in (absolute) magnitude with each of the three
outcomes and is no longer statistically signicant with migration as the dependent variable.
Panel C, Columns 1-6 report results with alternative construction of the 1860 population
variable. We include total population in 1860 in all the regressions reported in the paper to
partially account for both the migrant workforce (N) as well as the total surplus that was
available historically (R). The robustness tests replace total population with the migrant
population and the total workforce in 1860, respectively. Table 9 concludes with specica-
tions that include historical characteristics that could potentially determine the outcomes
of interest and are correlated with 1860 fractionalization. The population share of each
ethnicity in the 1860 census (computed at the county level) is included in Columns 7-9 to
allow for the possibility that individual-group share rather than inter-group fractionalization
determines our outcomes. To complete the panel, we allow for the possibility that the results
are driven by historical church competition rather than historical labor market competition
by including 1860 religious fractionalization as an additional regressor in Columns 10-12.
The results in Table 9 indicate that the 1860 fractionalization coecient remains signif-
icant at the 5 percent level and is very stable across the alternative specications, almost
without exception. As a nal robustness test, we report conditional and unconditional
estimates of the nonparametric relationship between the three outcomes and 1860 fraction-
alization in Figure 6.22 The individuals in the NLSY counties are drawn from 150 of our
approximately 400 counties, so it is unlikely that a few outlying counties are driving any of
the results. It is nevertheless reassuring to observe that the relationships reported earlier
with the linear parametric regressions hold up across the entire range of the 1860 fractional-
ization variable. The population share of Catholics and Lutherans and the share of students
enrolled in parochial schools double over this range, while the migration rate declines by
nearly 50 percent, emphasizing the importance of the eects we have uncovered.
5 Conclusion
This paper draws a connection between competing migrant networks in the Midwest when
it was rst developing, the in-group identity that emerged endogenously to support these
networks in particular locations (counties), and institutional participation and occupational
choice today. Individuals born in counties with greater ethnic fractionalization in 1860 are
today { 150 years later { (i) signicantly more likely to participate in socializing institutions
22The solid line in the Figure is the conditional estimate, with additional regressors partialled out non-
parametrically, while the dashed line is the unconditional estimate. The Epanechnikov kernel function is
used in Figure 5.
28such as churches and parochial schools that are associated with the transmission of identity
from one generation to the next, and (ii) signicantly less likely to select into mobile skilled
occupations.
Instead of focussing on dierences in occupational choice and mobility across denomi-
nations or between church participants and non-participants, we study how historical cir-
cumstances, measured by ethnic fractionalization, shaped the orientation of churches within
particular denominations dominated by the early migrants. The eect of historical fractional-
ization on participation in these denominations actually grows stronger over time, consistent
with a model in which identity is propagating through the population in select counties over
the generations and emphasizing the fact that small dierences in initial conditions can have
large long-term eects on institutions and individual choices. This last observation reinforces
Greif's (2006) view that institutions cannot be simply described by a set of formal rules, but
are in fact more complex arrangements whose formation and evolution are determined by
history and context.
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   Census year: 1860 1880 1900
(1) (2) (3)
Scandinavia
Danish 0.01 0.02 0.02
Norwegian 0.03 0.07 0.07
Swedish 0.02 0.06 0.10
British Isles
English 0.13 0.11 0.09
Irish 0.25 0.19 0.11
Scottish 0.03 0.03 0.02
Welsh 0.01 0.01 0.01
Western Europe
Dutch 0.01 0.01 0.01
French 0.03 0.02 0.01
German 0.32 0.37 0.41
Swiss 0.02 0.02 0.02
Eastern Europe
Czech 0.00 0.01 0.02
Polish 0.00 0.01 0.02
Other 0.14 0.07 0.09
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: IPUMS 1:100 sample, including all foreign-born individuals.
Census year: 1860 1880 1900
(1) (2) (3)
White collar
Professional 0.04 0.04 0.05
Manager 0.04 0.04 0.06
Clerical 0.00 0.01 0.02
Sales 0.01 0.02 0.03
Farm
Farmer 0.50 0.41 0.31
Laborer, Farm 0.12 0.17 0.17
Blue collar, nonfarm
Craftsman 0.10 0.08 0.09
Operative 0.05 0.08 0.09
Household Service 0.05 0.05 0.05
Service 0.00 0.01 0.02
Laborer, Non-Farm 0.09 0.10 0.12
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: IPUMS 1:100 sample, including all foreign-born individuals
who report that they are employed and report an occupational category.
Table 1: Ethnic Distribution, 1860-1900
Table 2: Occupational Distribution, 1860-1900ethnic manufacturing agriculture
Dependent variable: fractionalization share share population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Railroad through county, 1860 0.049 0.001 -0.013 0.102
(0.022) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
Distance to canal, 1890 -0.668 0.169 -0.034 -0.469
(0.191) (0.097) (0.125) (0.102)
Distance to Great Lakes harbor -0.252 -0.066 0.100 -0.136
(0.073) (0.029) (0.048) (0.056)
Observations 401 401 401 401
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Distance to canal and distance to Great Lakes harbor measured in thousands of kilometers.
Fractionalization is one minus the the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across
occupational categories.
Manufacturing share and agriculture share in 1860 computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.
Year:
agric manufac racial ethnic religious
Dependent variable: share share pop frac frac frac
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fractionalization, 1860 0.003 0.018 -0.269 0.011 -0.027 -0.124
(0.015) (0.020) (0.854) (0.017) (0.113) (0.034)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.090 -0.056 1.636 0.084 0.176 -0.257
(0.038) (0.053) (1.063) (0.055) (0.309) (0.110)
Agriculture share, 1860 0.136 0.057 -0.962 -0.080 0.049 -0.119
(0.027) (0.037) (0.746) (0.030) (0.225) (0.074)
Population, 1860 -0.087 0.030 11.716 0.246 0.326 0.124
(0.031) (0.026) (5.372) (0.052) (0.110) (0.076)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Manufacturing share in 1990 defined as share of civilian labor force employed in manufacturing.
Agriculture share in 1990 is computed using farm population and total population in county.
Ethnic fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of (white) ethnic concentration based on 16 ethnicities.
Racial fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of racial concentration based on 5 racial groups.
Religious fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of religious concentration based on 18 denominations.
1990
Table 4: Fractionalization in 1860 and County Characteristics in 1990
Table 3: Transportation Infrastructure and County Characteristics, 1860Table 5: Fractionalization in 1860 and Church Participation in 2000
Data set: CRB NLSY
Dependent variable:
share of county participating in 
church denomination
share of sample raised in church 
denomination
1860 variables measured in: county of residence county of birth
Church denomination: Catholic/Lutheran other Catholic/Lutheran other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fractionalization, 1860 0.216 -0.091 0.224 -0.132
(0.049) (0.027) (0.113) (0.139)
Manufacturing share, 1860 0.464 -0.182 0.341 -0.014
(0.134) (0.066) (0.317) (0.381)
Agriculture share, 1860 0.314 0.056 0.125 -0.207
(0.103) (0.065) (0.229) (0.255)
Population, 1860 -0.229 0.063 -0.111 0.119
(0.103) (0.031) (0.089) (0.089)
Observations 437 437 222 222
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.
Table 6: Fractionalization in 1860 and Mobility in 2000 (NLSY)












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fractionalization, 1860 -0.414 -0.108 -0.168 -0.021 0.127
(0.138) (0.058) (0.084) (0.058) (0.076)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.242 -0.159 -0.378 0.154 0.246
(0.260) (0.114) (0.189) (0.094) (0.215)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.317 -0.133 -0.349 0.159 0.206
(0.222) (0.079) (0.133) (0.075) (0.123)
Population, 1860 0.0648 0.026 0.029 0.000 0.035
(0.040) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.017)
White 0.284 0.077 0.085 0.013 0.096
(0.052) (0.018) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
Female -0.014 0.000 0.008 -0.004 0.009
(0.024) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Age 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005
Observations 1437 1216 1216 1237 1237
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.Table 7: Fractionalization in 1860 and Education (Population Census)
Dependent variable: parochial share education expenditure per student
Year: 1970 1980 1970 1980
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fractionalization, 1860 0.071 0.070 -0.072 0.274
(0.016) (0.012) (0.119) (0.187)
Manufacturing share, 1860 0.126 0.072 0.027 1.058
(0.049) (0.044) (0.443) (0.594)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.014 -0.016 0.317 0.044
(0.039) (0.032) (0.343) (0.425)
Population, 1860 0.025 0.050 0.013 0.781
(0.021) (0.015) (0.236) (0.388)
Observations 437 437 437 437
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Education expenditure per student is total public spending on grades K-12 (measured in thousands of 1990 dollars) divided
by total public school enrollment grades K-12.
Parochial share is parochial school enrollment grades K-12 divided by school enrollment grades K-12.
Table 8: Fractionalization in 1860 and Education (NLSY)





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fractionalization, 1860 -3.185 -0.056 -0.120 -0.242
(8.695) (0.082) (0.126) (0.094)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -14.421 -0.185 -0.347 -0.077
(19.737) (0.180) (0.241) (0.143)
Agriculture share, 1860 -17.311 -0.269 -0.477 0.110
(17.015) (0.178) (0.198) (0.165)
Population, 1860 -3.028 -0.061 -0.009 0.026
(2.039) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033)
White 25.469 0.043 0.128 0.041
(1.724) (0.024) (0.021) (0.056)
Female -3.314 0.005 -0.041 0.004
(1.893) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023)
Age 2.642 0.009 0.010 0.0009
(0.366) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 1390 1437 1437 289
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Fractionalization, manufacturing share, and agricultural share measured in county of birth.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
AFQT is the score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
High school completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed high school, including GED.
College completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed a four-year college/university degree.
Average migation in college major is the proportion of individuals in the respondents' college major who reside
outside of their counties of birth.Table 9: Robustness Tests
Dependent variable: a b c a b c a b c a b c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Alternative construction of ethnic fractionalization variable
Fractionalization 0.356 -0.368 0.102 0.361 -0.292 0.075 0.288 -0.410 0.081 0.203 -0.154 0.057
(0.053) (0.121) (0.015) (0.050) (0.195) (0.012) (0.051) (0.169) (0.012) (0.044) (0.095) (0.013)
Observations 290 1157 290 517 1471 517 415 1417 415 434 1436 434
Robustness test fractionalization, 1850 fractionalization, 1870 exclude counties w/ less than 20 obs, 1860 men only, 1860
Panel B: Alternative construction of ethnic fractionalization variable, continued
Fractionalization, 1860 0.255 -0.327 0.078 0.225 -0.452 0.066 0.120 -0.422 0.055 0.006 -0.002 0.001
(0.046) (0.168) (0.012) (0.049) (0.156) (0.012) (0.047) (0.136) (0.012) (0.001) (0.005) (0.0002)
Observations 385 1369 385 437 1437 437 437 1437 437 437 1437 437
Robustness test exclude farmers 4 occupational categories no occupation categories include native born
Panel C: Alternative construction of population variable and additional regressors
Fractionalization, 1860 0.131 -0.396 0.060 0.210 -0.411 0.069 0.095 -0.482 0.034 0.211 -0.443 0.067
(0.049) (0.136) (0.012) (0.049) (0.138) (0.012) (0.049) (0.178) (0.013) (0.049) (0.139) (0.125)
Observations 437 1437 437 437 1437 437 437 1437 437 437 1437 437
Robustness test migrant population working population pop share of each ethnicity religious fractionalization
Notes: Dependent variable "a" is share of Catholics and Lutherans in the population in 2000 (CRB data at the county level).
Dependent variable "b" is migrated by 2000 (NLSY data at the individual level).
Dependent variable "c" is share of students in parochial schools in 1980 (population census at the county level).
In individual-level regressions, standard errors in parentheses clustered at the county level.
In county-level regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include 1860 manufacturing share, 1860 agricultural share, and 1860 population as regressors.
Individual-level regressions with migrated as the dependent variable include white, female, and age as additional regressors.
Population share of each ethnicity and religious fractionalization in 1860 are included separately as additional regressors in Panel C, Columns 7-12.